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TWO DECADES OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
SAMUEL W. BUELL* & BRANDON L. GARRETT**
Twenty years after the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) first
published guidelines for the criminal prosecution of corporations, in the fall of
2019, we solicited the articles that follow in this Issue. Though American law on
corporate criminal liability dates back to the nineteenth century, it was not until
the end of the twentieth century that investigating and prosecuting corporations
and their employees became a major and institutionalized feature of criminal
justice in the United States, chiefly at the federal level. With that still relatively
young practice concluding its second decade, and having produced a now vibrant
and growing field of scholarship, a broader assessment is in order.
What have we learned after two decades of organizational prosecutions in the
United States, since the first publication of the Justice Department guidelines in
a memo by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder?1 We have seen a string
of updated prosecution guidelines, as each presidential Administration puts its
stamp on an evolving approach towards prosecuting corporations, by adding to a
now quite lengthy set of principles in the Justice Manual.2 We will no doubt see
further revisions to those organizational prosecution guidelines in the years
ahead. The government, the private bar, the bench, the academy, and the press
continue to debate and refine the particulars of how to punish and deter crime
within the large modern corporation.
Meanwhile, we have seen no end to the cycles of severe corporate
malfeasance. The breadth of corporate crimes and the scale of the offenses—
from small ten thousand-dollar schemes to defraud the federal government, to
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multi-billion-dollar frauds that endanger entire economies—are a matter of
major legal and political importance. The crimes in question range from breadand-butter wire fraud, to antitrust, to environmental crimes, to financial crimes,
to kickbacks in pharmaceutical and other product manufacturing, to money
laundering, and to foreign bribery. In short, we have seen “recurring corporate
misconduct, from the accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom, to the BP oil
spill, to the Volkswagen emissions scandal,” as James Nelson writes in this Issue.3
This Issue, which we were honored to convene and contribute to, and for
which we thank the Law and Contemporary Problems editors for their tireless
editorial work in bringing to publication, addresses this new landscape twenty
years on from the so-called Holder Memo. The articles that follow identify a
number of questions that have arisen in the realm corporate criminal liability,
present potential answers to those and other questions, and propose new areas
for consideration over the next twenty years and beyond.
One set of questions relates to the now mature American system of
prosecuting corporations—and, most often, settling with them—as a means to
reducing the prevalence of crime by employees. In Three Conceptions of
Corporate Crime (and One Avenue for Reform),4 Miriam Baer assesses the
growth of informal and out-of-court settlements in corporate cases. Baer focuses
on the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), calling it “neither fish nor fowl.”5
Such agreements are filed in court, so are not purely private settlements, but
judicial review is highly deferential. The agreements include fines, but also
compliance provisions, and some focus on cooperation in investigations of
individuals. Baer notes: “Both the DPA itself and its underlying procedural
framework have attracted pervasive criticism from commentators—for being too
weak (mostly), too strong (sometimes), too arbitrarily applied, and far too
lacking in transparency and follow-up. Despite these criticisms, this settlement
format has flourished for roughly two or more decades.”6 The flexibility in these
settlements and the compromises they represent, may explain their staying
power. Baer argues, however, that “[t]here is at least one additional reason that
DPAs and their close cousins have been able to outlast their critics, which is
society’s collective inability to decide what corporate crime prosecution is
supposed to accomplish.”7 Baer calls for legislation to reduce reliance on these
largely extra-judicial compromises and to improve regulatory and judicial
oversight.
If there is ambivalence about the goals of corporate prosecutions, perhaps
scholars can assist by further focus on underlying theory. One purpose of

3. James D. Nelson, Some Realism About Corporate Crime, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2020, at 113, 113.
4. Miriam H. Baer, Three Conceptions of Corporate Crime (and One Avenue for Reform), 83 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2–3.
7. Id. at 4.
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corporate prosecutions could be to punish corporations, rather than use them as
an instrument for crime control, as through compliance-type reforms. In Retiring
Corporate Retribution,8 Samuel Buell takes one theory off the list of candidates:
Buell explains how “corporations cannot be punished retributively,” and how
discussion of corporate retribution still has not fully acknowledged the structural
limitations to applying principles of individual criminal responsibility to business
firms.9 As a result, “[t]here will always be a gap between what corporations
deserve and what they receive.”10 This gap cannot be filled with a “punishment”
directed at the firm itself. Thus, there are not only practical but also theoretical
reasons to focus corporate prosecutions on how to effectively produce
accountability in organizational settings.
If the proper focus is on instrumental goals, though, there is much that the
current settlement-oriented compliance approach neglects. In Testing
Compliance,11 Brandon Garrett and Greg Mitchell describe how one key focus
could be on cementing robust compliance, to ensure that corporations do not
engage in repeat misconduct and are successfully reformed and rehabilitated.
However, despite the stated goal of rewarding and requiring, at times, “effective”
compliance by corporations, the effectiveness of such compliance efforts is not
empirically validated. Indeed, enforcement approaches often discourage
validation of compliance, which could result in self-critical information leading
to further liability. Garrett and Mitchell conclude by explaining how an improved
instrumental legal regime for corporate crime could incentivize testing of
compliance and promulgate validated compliance methods.
In The Government’s Prioritization of Information over Sanction:
Implications for Compliance,12 Veronica Root Martinez describes the central
importance of information sharing: the interest in promoting reporting and
disclosure, rather than punishment or compliance. Martinez describes how a
range of federal enforcers have adopted a model of enforcement that “prioritizes
gathering information from firms over levying significant sanctions against
them.”13 In corporate prosecution cases, the government: “(i) exerts pressure to
incentivize firms to share information with the government, (ii) eschews
sanctions in favor of oversight, and (iii) often sides with corporations in limiting
the transparency of investigations into wrongdoing.”14 Martinez argues that if
information gathering is the central goal of corporate liability, then enforcers
should more clearly use sanctions to reward sound compliance and sharing of
8. Samuel W. Buell, Retiring Corporate Retribution, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at
25.
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 44.
11. Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
4, 2020, at 47.
12. Veronica Root Martinez, The Government’s Prioritization of Information over Sanction:
Implications for Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 85.
13. Id. at 99.
14.

Id. at 88.
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information concerning compliance failures. The purposeful system of rewards
that Martinez describes might be complimented by the approach towards
prioritizing empirically validated reporting and testing of compliance as proposed
by Garrett and Mitchell.
In Some Realism About Corporate Crime,15 James Nelson addresses the
problem of corporate crime at the broader level of whether the corporate form
itself requires rethinking and redesign. He describes how realists about corporate
rights have urged a pragmatic or legal realist approach that focuses on the
“concrete facts and relations” that should guide the law’s treatment of
corporations.16 Nelson sets out how “we ought to have a practical accounting of
likely costs and benefits before we abandon core features of the corporate
form.”17 Nelson concludes that we do not necessarily need to discard or reform
the current corporate form, but rather should take advantage of its benefits for
accountability. Nelson’s approach is consistent with each of those just described:
a focus on the utilitarian case for corporate accountability, and a concrete focus
on the empirical needs of an effective program of accountability.
Mihailis Diamantis, in The Body Corporate,18 begins with the longstanding
problem in corporate criminal liability of whether and how corporations can
fulfill the mens rea elements of crimes. Diamantis then turns that discussion to
the question of the physical actor in criminal theory. If we treat corporations, at
least as a legal matter, as being capable of having mental culpability, we should
also ask what their bodies are for the purpose of the actus reus dimension of
criminality. Diamantis argues for the promise of a novel perspective on what
parts and functions of the corporation might comprise the corporation’s “body,”
that is, a theory allowing for the potential of imposing liability for the harmful
results of a wider variety of corporate functions and processes. Diamantis
observes that this discussion has been missing from the theory of corporate
criminality: “Just as the law needs an account of how corporations think if they
are to be held to account for crimes and torts, it also needs an account of how
corporations can act.”19
The literature on corporate crime is pervaded by efforts to apply and
analogize individual criminal processes to the corporation. In Using the
Corporate Prosecution and Sentencing Model for Individuals: The Case for a
Unified Federal Approach,20 Rachel Barkow turns that perspective around,
considering how treatment of corporations might apply to individuals. Barkow
asks why corporations benefit from the individualized approach of negotiated
enforcement and settlement, usually with attention to the details of a firm’s
15. Nelson, supra note 3.
16. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673
(1926).
17. Nelson, supra note 3, at 115.
18. Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Body Corporate, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 133.
19. Id. at 134.
20. Rachel E. Barkow, Using the Corporate Prosecution and Sentencing Model for Individuals: The
Case for a Unified Federal Approach, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 159.
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business and its processes, while individuals are sentenced in federal court under
a rigid grid-like structure. Both the DOJ and Sentencing Commission have taken
a view that the most severe sentences should be imposed in individual cases, but
in contrast, “they have recognized the costs of severity in the corporate realm.”21
Indeed, beginning with the Holder Memo, the DOJ has developed detailed
leniency-preferring guidelines for corporate cases. As Barkow observes, no such
rules exist for individual charging decisions for the most part, and instead, the
DOJ has often issued brief guidance that the most severe provable charges should
be pursued against individuals. Sentencing guidelines, similarly, have often not
taken into account potential rehabilitation or the relevance of a range of other
individual characteristics. Thus, Barkow notes: “There is no reason to maintain a
policy that sees the value in saving and recognizing the worth of companies, but
ignores the value in saving and recognizing the worth of individuals.”22
What might the next two decades bring for the field of corporate
prosecutions? One common theme among these wonderful contributions is that
the practice of corporate prosecutions needs a theory, and to some extent already
has one. It should more consciously focus on the instrumental goals of detecting
and preventing corporate misconduct, while clearing away many of the
distracting old conversations about individual criminal law theory in the
corporate context.
In an even more developed and mature field of instrumental corporate
enforcement, prosecutors would validate information-seeking and compliance
approaches more rigorously and the field would be subject to more sophisticated
assessment by academics for its broad social value in light of the still growing
problem of corporate crime. In a future administration, DOJ might: consider
relaxing its longstanding opposition to more judicial and other institutional
supervision of, and involvement in, its administration of corporate settlements;
pursue corporate investigations and prosecutions in a manner that makes data
collection and analysis far more accessible; and continue to refine, based on
available evidence, how monetary and other sanctions can be further calibrated
and specified to produce optimal incentives for self-reporting, cooperation, and
remediation.
Meanwhile, it is time to apply lessons from the decades of modern corporate
prosecution to the individual criminal setting, both within corporations and
outside them. It is fair to expect that twenty years from now, the problem of
corporate crime might be as settled as a matter of theory as the nature of basic
individual criminality is now. Perhaps then there can be a full turn from
theoretical first principles so that questions about how best to manage corporate
prosecution and punishment become—as they have in recent years with
prosecution of individuals for all types of crime—predominantly a matter of
debating procedural justice and costs and benefits on the ground.

21. Id. at 161.
22. Id.

